Irish Blog Whacked

Wednesday, November 10, 2010

WASP Legacy of John Bullshoite's Butcher's Apron






England during the 16th century was involved in the settlement of
Ireland its first colony, drawing on its experience dating back to the
Norman invasion in 1171. Several people who helped with the
Plantations of Ireland were also key players in the early colonisation
of North America, particularly a gang known as the "West Country men",
including the infamous Humphrey Gilbert, Walter Raleigh, Francis
Drake, John Hawkins and Richard Grenville.

During the 15th and 16th centuries, Portugal and Spain who started
European exploration of the five continents, established large
overseas colonies. Jealous of this great wealth England, France and
the Netherlands began to establish colonies of their own in the
Americas and Asia. Wars in the 17th and 18th centuries with the
Netherlands and France left Britain as the dominant colonial power in
North America and India. The loss of colonies in North America in
1783, after a war of independence was a blow to the British but
despite this setback the British left their own kind the WASPs in
charge in North America and turned their attention towards Africa,
Asia and the Pacific. Following the defeat of Napoleon and France in
1815, Britain enjoyed almost total dominance and expanded its Empire
across the globe. Degrees of autonomy were granted to its white
settled colonies but generally it left its complaint WASP s in charge.


WASP - White Anglo-Saxon Protestant

The term's origins are from white Americans of Anglo-Saxon descent,
who were Protestant in religion. Initially WASP applied exclusively to
people of the upper class establishment, who formed a powerful elite.
Many people now referred to as "WASPs" are not necessarily Anglo-Saxon
or of English descendants. In modern U.S. usage, WASP may now include
Protestants from Holland, Germany, France, Scandinavia, Scottish,
Irish Royalist and Welsh.Dutch such as the Vanderbilt, Roosevelt.
German such as Rockefellers and Astor families.French such as the Du
Pont family.Scots such as Carnegie.

WASP has many meanings. In sociological terms it is that part of the
U.S. population that believe they founded the country. The term can
have negative connotations. About a quarter of the U.S. population is
WASP today but they continue to have a disproportionate influence over
American institutions. Usage of the term WASP is also prevalent in
other former British colonies such as Canada and Australia. The term
was popularized by Professor E. Digby Baltzell in his book, The
Protestant Establishment; Aristocracy & Caste in America but it was
first used by Andrew Hacker in 1957. The New England Yankee elite were
almost exclusively of English stock with some early German immigrants
all Protestant, who arrived in the Dutch colony of New Netherland. In
addition to being Protestant, WASPs were primarily Presbyterian.

Many U.S. North-easterners are "WASPs" who refer to themselves as
"Yankees". In the South, WASPs are less common.In the United States,
it is most widely used today to differentiate early arriving, Western
European, "old stock" Americans with the descendants of groups from
Southern, Eastern Europe, Ireland and other parts of the world. The
term WASP is often used alongside the word "The Establishment" or to
create an air of privilege, that white Protestants in America
apparently enjoy. It is also often used today as a derogatory term.
Many dictionaries warn that the term is "derogatory" or "insulting".


Culture attributed to WASPs

The original WASP establishment created and dominated the social
structure of the United States when it originally took shape in the
17th century. Many term America's elite institutions as WASP, when in
fact it was always a wider, more diverse group. This Upper Class would
claim to dominate American prep schools, older universities, Ivy
Leagues, liberal arts colleges, NESCAC schools. These elitist
institutions are still important to WASPs, who are taught skills,
habits, and attitudes, forming connections which carry over to
finance, culture, and politics. People labeled as "WASPs" still have
prominent families preserving an attitude toward marriage rom the
British aristocracy: A marriage is carefully scrutinized by both groom
and bride's families. Marriage is often about maintaining each party
in their social and cultural status.

WASP families generally pursue traditional British sports such as
squash, golf, tennis, horse riding, polo, yachting, pursuits that are
reserved as labels of affluence. Society pages list the privileged,who
mingle in the same private clubs, attend the same churches and live in
neighborhoods like Philadelphia's Main Line, Chestnut Hill, New York
City's Upper East Side, Boston's Beacon Hill are some examples with
unwritten rules to separate the well-bred from the wealthy peasants.

After World War II and the bankruptcy of British, the WASP networks
of privilege and power of the old Protestant establishment began to
lose influence. Nevertheless WASPs remain represented alongside
Zionism in the country's cultural, political, and economic élite.
While the WASP establishment is no longer the sole elite of America,
it remains significant. WASPs are now predominantly upper middle and
upper class, well educated inclusive of members of the elite. Some
WASP families now occasionally allow marriage with Jews or Catholics
and even other races occasionally are not always frowned upon.

WASP are still dominant in the Republican Party. Catholics in the
Northeast generally Irish or Italian immigrants, populate the
Democratic party. Catholic voters and politicians fail to find favor
among WASP voters. In 1952 the senate election for Massachusetts with
John F. Kennedy was clearly split along sectarian lines, quite similar
to the loyalist version of WASP in Occupied Ireland today. From being
Britain's first colony, many maintain British occupied Ireland will
also be her last, in what has been a bloody, ruthless holocaust, not
just for the millions of Irish who lost their lives to savage
invasions and occupation but Britisn's own cannon fodder of every
generation. The legacy of the British Empire can be found with the
U.S. today as demonstrated in the following article







llusions and Empire

By Charles Scaliger

November 09, 2010 "The New American" -- - On a bitterly cold day in
mid-January, 1842, British soldiers manning the garrison at Jalalabad
on the Afghan frontier saw a strange sight. Out of the snowy wasteland
rode a single man, badly wounded, on a dying horse. His name, he told
the soldiers, was William Brydon.

Brydon was a surgeon with the British East India Company and had
studied medicine at Edinburgh University. He showed the soldiers a
terrible wound on his head, where a sword had removed part of his
skull. He had survived only because a magazine he had stuffed under
his hat for extra warmth had cushioned the blow. Dr. Brydon was the
only survivor of a 4,500-man British army, commanded by General
William Elphinstone, to escape from the occupation of Kabul. The rest
lay massacred in the snowy Afghan passes or, in a few cases, in Afghan
prisons. General Elphinstone himself died a few months later in
captivity.

Perhaps no Englishman in the 19th century had better firsthand
experience with the costs of empire than William Brydon. Fifteen years
after the inglorious conclusion of the First Anglo-Afghan War, Dr.
Brydon found himself trapped in the British Residency at Lucknow in
north central India during the infamous six-month siege that was the
most celebrated event of the 1857 Mutiny, a bloody uprising against
British authorities. Dr. Brydon sustained a serious leg injury during
the siege but, unlike hundreds of his fellow countrymen, survived.

It is impossible to say whether Dr. Brydon or others of the countless
thousands of British soldiers, bureaucrats, judges, engineers, and
others who sustained the British Empire in India — known informally as
the Raj — for almost 200 years were able to perceive the design for
which so many lives and fortunes, Indian and British, were squandered.
Certainly the world-engirding British Empire, of which the Raj was the
crown jewel, was widely regarded — by observers at a safe distance —
as the greatest civilizing force the world had ever seen. Yet this
alleged boon to humanity, which began as an exercise in unbridled
mercantilism, gradually transformed into a global crusade on behalf of
Anglo-Saxon civilization, before collapsing ignominiously in the
mid-20th century, leaving its mistress, Great Britain herself,
exhausted and virtually bankrupt. Nowhere was this tragic trajectory
plainer than in the long history of British involvement with South
Asia — today the nations of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh,
and Burma, as well as Sri Lanka, formerly Ceylon, under a separate
British administration from the Raj itself, and Nepal and Bhutan,
which were never fully brought into subjection. In considering briefly
the history of this region, we would do well to enquire whether the
United States, the self-anointed heirs of the British Empire, are not
following a path similar to the one that the British once followed.

Gaining Ground in India
The peoples of the Indian subcontinent were certainly no strangers to
imperial domination at the time the British East India Company first
set up shop on the southwest coast of India in the early 1600s. The
dominant power in South Asia at the time, as it had been for
generations, was the Islamic Mughal Empire, administered by Turkic
peoples out of central Asia. But by the mid-1700s, the Mughal Empire
was crumbling, and the opportunistic British seized the moment.

The Battle of Plassey in 1757 is usually reckoned as the starting
point for the British Empire in India. Fought in the steamy jungles of
Bengal not far from modern-day Calcutta, Plassey was a total victory
for the British forces under Robert Clive, and left the British in
charge of much of the territory of Bengal. At first the East India
Company, not the British government per se, remained in charge of
British India to maintain a fiction of separateness from the British
Crown. The first Governor-General of India, Warren Hastings, was
appointed in 1773. Upon his resignation in 1784, he returned to
England and was impeached for corruption at the urging of Edmund Burke
— the same eloquent statesman who openly sympathized with the American
revolutionaries and later wrote a damning critique of the French
Revolution. By the time of Hastings’ impeachment the East India
Company, which was in charge of British commercial interests from
India to the East Indies, controlled, in Burke’s words, “an annual
territorial revenue of seven millions sterling, … an army of sixty
thousand men, and … the lives and fortunes of thirty millions of their
fellow-creatures.” India, Burke pointed out, was not some barbarous
backwater inhabited by savages in loincloths; it was instead an
ancient and comparatively civilized land, whose inhabitants were due
the same universal natural rights accorded Englishmen by the Magna
Carta. Instead, they were kept in subject by a corrupt, arbitrary
corporate regime with little accountability to British law with its
many protections. Hastings was ultimately acquitted, however, by a
Parliament less concerned with the abstract moral concerns of Burke
and his allies than with the naked expedience of profit-taking.

But profits needed to be defended, and the century that followed the
Battle of Plassey was a bloody one indeed. At the same time the
British were fighting the French and the Americans in Europe and the
Western Hemisphere, they were expanding their control over India.

In the late 1760s, as discontent simmered in the American colonies,
British forces on the other side of the globe launched the first of
four wars against the kingdom of Mysore, centered on the Deccan
plateau in southern India. The Anglo-Mysore wars lasted until 1799,
costing many thousands of lives and leaving the British in control of
most of the southern subcontinent. The third and most decisive of
these wars ended with the defeat of Mysore Prince Tippu Sultan by none
other than General Charles Cornwallis, who was Hastings’ successor as
Governor-General of India and was out for redemption after the
humiliation at Yorktown.

In 1777, the British launched the first of three costly wars against
the Maratha Empire, which controlled much of former Mughal territory
in central and northern India. The first war was a standoff, but the
second, fought from 1803-1805, and the third, from 1817-1818, left
Britain in charge of most of the rest of the subcontinent — this
during the period when Napoleonic France rose and fell.

The First Afghan War, of which William Brydon was the lone survivor,
was another major military event, the first of three Anglo-Afghan
wars, the last of which took place in 1919. British expansion into
Afghanistan was motivated by rivalry with Russia over control of
Central Asia in a drawn-out geopolitical chess match known to history
as “the Great Game,” the 19th-century analog of the Cold War.

Then, in 1857, on the centenary of the Battle of Plassey, came the
Mutiny. This horrific civil uprising, known in India as the First
Indian War of Independence, was prosecuted by rebellious sepoys —
Indian soldiers trained and employed by the British. Very nearly did
India succeed in wresting its independence from British overlords but,
in the end, the British prevailed, albeit at a terrible price, and the
tranquility of servitude was temporarily restored to the subcontinent.
In the wake of the Mutiny, the East India Company was relieved of its
colonial authority; thenceforth, India was to be an undisguised part
of the British Empire, and its Governor-General was the Queen’s
Viceroy.

The latter half of the 19th century was a period of comparative
tranquility, during which the “swadeshi” or “home rule” movement in
India gradually gathered a head of steam. With the advent of World War
I, most Indians supported the British, in the hopes that they would be
rewarded with independence after the war. Instead, the British
government reacted with increasing severity toward pro-independence
Indians, including the celebrated Mohandas Gandhi and his movement. In
April 1919, British troops under the command of Brigadier General
Reginald Dyer opened fire on demonstrating crowds in Amritsar, the
holy city of the Sikh religion in Punjab, massacring hundreds of
innocents, including women and children. The unrepentant Dyer embodied
the worst of British imperialism, the armored fist under the velvet
glove. In addition to the massacre, he was proud of torturing
prisoners, sometimes publicly, and was never punished for his actions.

The Amritsar massacre was the last straw for Indians. During the
1920s, riots, strikes, and acts of terrorism soared, and desperate
British authorities reacted vigorously. By the 1930s, the British were
ready to grant independence to India. But for the Second World War,
which forced the British to put those plans on hold, India probably
would have achieved independence by 1940, so dire had the situation
become.

By the time the Second World War was over, however, the entire British
Empire was in a shambles. The dramatic Japanese defeat of the British
at Singapore, and their lightning conquest of British Malaya that
followed, exploded forever the myth of British invincibility. At war’s
end Britain, exhausted and financially shattered, had no choice but to
accede to Indian -demands.

Broken Empire
Unfortunately, because Britain, like most powers afflicted with
imperial hubris, stubbornly held out until she had no other options,
Indian independence was hastily agreed to and clumsily executed.
Although Gandhi’s vision of a unified India with a secular government
was popular in Britain, Muslim leader Mohammed Ali Jinnah, taking
advantage of British weakness, insisted on the creation of a brand-new
Muslim state, Pakistan, to be carved out of portions of northwestern
and northeastern India. The result was apocalyptic. As the clock
ticked down to independence and partition in 1948, millions of Hindus,
fearing Muslim ill will, chose to evacuate what would become East and
West Pakistan, and huge numbers of Muslims fled India for the new
Islamic havens. Rioting and civil war ensued, and hundreds of
thousands were butchered in the chaos. Gandhi himself was assassinated
shortly after independence, and while the violence eventually
subsided, the enmity between India and Pakistan, which has now grown
into a full-blown nuclear rivalry, persists. Such were the
after-effects of the Raj.

The British Empire and the Raj never wanted for detractors among the
British public during its lifetime but, then as now, such people were
regarded as hopeless idealists. The empire, the prodigy of the age,
was a force for enlightenment, many argued. Indeed, starting with the
Governor-Generalship of William Bentinck, which ended in 1835, the
British began to actively work to Christianize India and to stamp out
practices associated with Hinduism that were inconsistent with
civilized society. Sati, or self-immolation by Brahmin widows, was
wiped out, as was the monstrous cult of Thugee, a secret society made
up of both Hindus and Muslims that committed ritual murder and
spoliation in the name of the Hindu goddess Kali. The British also
brought internal improvements like railroads and highways, and
instituted the English legal system to India.

But in the end, the “civilizing mission” probably accomplished far
less than believed. It is interesting to compare the woeful
post-colonial histories of Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
and Burma, with those portions of South Asia that were spared the rod
of imperialism. Nepal, the Himalayan kingdom where Everest and most of
the world’s highest mountains are found, never bowed beneath the
British yoke. The fierce Nepali Gurkhas fought the British to a
standstill in the Gurkha War of 1814-1816, and earned protectorate
status as a result. Aside from a brief civil war that was amicably
resolved a few years ago, multi-ethnic Nepal has largely been at
peace. Recently, and with little outside urging, the Nepalese, tired
of their royal family’s scandalous conduct, decided to abolish the
monarchy and replace it with popular government. Nearby Bhutan, a
remote Buddhist kingdom in a lush corner of the eastern Himalayas, has
also decided to peacefully abolish its -monarchy.

In mainland Southeast Asia, the only country to enjoy comparative
peace and the absence of despotism has been Thailand, the only nation
in that part of the world to escape colonial conquest. Wherever the
hand of empire imposed temporary order, misery has been the almost
inevitable result when it was withdrawn.

Many British believed (and still believe) that the era of Pax
Britannica — a period of supposed world peace enforced by the
formidable British armed forces from 1820 to 1914 — was justification
enough for empire. Her navies and armies kept the peace, it was
argued, where no one else could. According to historian John Keay, the
actual record is rather at variance with the mythology: “[Not] by any
reasonable construction could Pax Britannica be taken to mean actual
peace, either in India or in the wider British Empire…. By one
reckoning, there was not a single year between the Napoleonic Wars and
the First World War … when British-led forces were not engaged in
hostilities somewhere in the world.” These were not, for the most
part, the epic, set-piece wars and battles that thrill military
historians, but sordid, bloody, drawn-out insurgencies, the “savage
wars of peace” alluded to by Anglo-Indian author Rudyard Kipling and
familiar to the French in Algeria, the Russians in Chechnya, and, now,
the Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Nor was the Raj, or the wider empire, justifiable in economic terms.
“The order and stability which British rule undeniably brought did not
come cheap,” Keay has pointed out. “In the experience of most Indians
Pax Britannica meant mainly ‘Tax Britannica.’” Simply put, the British
looted the subcontinent for what they could get, taxing the
inhabitants heavily and stripping away India’s valuable forests of
teak, mahogany, and other rare woods. The wealth thereby extracted
lined the pockets of the East India Company and subsequent mercantile
interests, but did little to improve the condition either of ordinary
English or the subject peoples of the empire. The British Empire, like
all such enterprises, was a project conceived and executed by and for
the benefit of the very few, laid on the shoulders of the many. It was
the latter whose taxes paid for Britain’s armies and navies and for
the civil servants and contractors whose livelihood depended on the
continuance of empire.

Finally, inasmuch as the British, much like Americans today, believed
passionately in their own benevolence, it was fashionable to assume
that the British Empire in general and the Raj in particular had come
about, not through calculated rapacity, but by historical accident.
“The British,” writes John Keay, “would often think of their conquests
in India as fortuitous. It gratified a cherished conceit about the
Englishman’s amateurish innocence and it obviated the need to confront
awkward questions.... [One British observer, Sir William Jones,
marveled] at how Bengal had, like an over-ripe mango, ‘fallen into
England’s lap while she was sleeping.’... [According to this version
of history], the Company was ‘sucked into’ the ‘power vacuum’ left by
the declining Mughal Empire,” captive to historical forces beyond her
control. Needless to say, this version of events does not square with
British and with East India Company machinations to create adversaries
and then play them off against each other in the chessboard of Asiatic
politics. The men who created the British Empire were neither stupid
nor haphazard. As Edmund Burke famously observed, “A great empire and
little minds go ill together.”

Today, of course, most of the exuviae of the former British Empire are
independent countries, if not altogether free. But now it is our own
country, or rather, a small gang of elites, that aims to pick up where
the British left off, in the Middle East, and in Central and Southern
Asia. The pieces have changed — instead of spices, lumber, and tea,
oil is the token of the realm — but the nature of the game remains the
same. As with the British, so with us: An overwhelming number of
Americans, while deploring American imperialism in practice, have been
conditioned to see ourselves as hostages to history. American aircraft
carriers instead of British battleships are now deemed indispensable
for keeping peace all over the world. American bases are found in most
countries in the Middle East and Central Asia. While it seems unlikely
that the American Empire will incorporate South Asia as it has the
Middle East, thanks to the war on terrorism Afghanistan and Pakistan,
at least, are rapidly evolving into house-trained regimes at the beck
and call of the U.S. government.

If there’s one thing certain about empire building, it is that such
projects cannot be sustained. Like the British, we seek to persuade
ourselves — or, more accurately, globalist elites seek to persuade us
— that empire building can be profitable, that the indefinite
occupation of countries like Iraq will pay for itself many times over
in oil revenues, and that militarism will open doors for enhanced
commerce. Now, of course, we are finding out in the Middle East and
Afghanistan, just as the British did in India, that only a few will
benefit at a cost to many. Who can possibly tout up the cost of
America’s enormous new “Residency” in Baghdad, the largest embassy
complex ever built, transparently designed to serve as the
headquarters for our newly minted Middle Eastern protectorates? The
contractors building the embassy, enriched by U.S. taxpayer dollars,
doubtless have few complaints. So likewise the security companies, the
weapons manufacturers, and, yes, the oil industry. For ordinary
Americans and Iraqis — the former burdened by spiraling oil prices and
a deepening economic crisis made worse by a trillion-dollar war, the
latter groaning under the yoke of terrorism, civil war, and an
ever-deteriorating standard of living — the war in the Middle East is
a bitter pill indeed. So also is proving to be the occupation of
Afghanistan, which soon will equal the duration of the Soviet Union’s
adventure in that unhappy land.

Where will it all end? If the verdict of history is any guide,
America, like Britain, may well continue to squander her strength and
blood waging “savage wars of peace” across the globe until her
resources are exhausted. Over the past two decades, America has
garrisoned most of the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and Central
Asia; we have yet to withdraw voluntarily from any of those places. As
with Britain, our empire has become bound up with our sense of
prestige; too many of us are invested in the status quo, such that
withdrawal — from Iraq and Afghanistan, especially — is seen by too
many as a betrayal rather than a corrective. In a word, it is not at
all certain that America will ever relinquish empire until she is
compelled to do so, by the brutal laws of economics, human behavior,
and history — “the gods of the copybook headings,” Rudyard Kipling
called them — which brook no defiance in the long run.

On the other hand, what might it take to steer America away from the
destructive, debilitating, potentially suicidal path of empire? A
return to constitutional government would be a tremendous start.
Merely reasserting the congressional prerogative to declare war would
greatly curtail American wars of pure aggression, like the invasion
and occupation of Iraq. Illegal wars and consequent occupations, like
those of Yugoslavia and the Korean Peninsula, would be nullified and
occupying forces brought home. The Koreans, the Japanese, the
Europeans, Turkey, the republics of Central Asia — all these would
become responsible for their own defense.

Of course, any proposal to withdraw from our many so-called
“obligations” overseas will provoke howls of protest from the
commentariat, as we have seen with the 2008 Ron Paul presidential
campaign. Yet ultimately we will have no choice in the matter.
American military hegemony will only last for a brief moment, indeed,
is already threatened by imperial overstretch combined with economic
malaise. We will not be the world’s only superpower forever.

Unfortunately, we have never been a particularly peaceful people. We
are quick to rise to anger against enemies real and perceived, and put
our trust in military force to have our way with the nations of the
world. This makes us vulnerable to those who would use war as an
excuse to enlarge the powers of government at home and abroad.

To return for a moment to Kipling, a man who was born in British India
and was intimately familiar with the workings of empire: On the
diamond jubilee of Queen Victoria’s reign in 1897, he composed a poem
that offended a lot of people in high places, because it dared to
state what few in Britain in those days were willing to acknowledge:
that empires are short-lived and that, because of pride, they usually
come to calamitous ends. The poem, now known as the hymn
“Recessional,” reads in part:

God of our fathers, known of old —
Lord of our far-flung battle line
Beneath whose awful hand we hold
Dominion over palm and pine —
Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget — lest we forget!
The tumult and the shouting dies;
The captains and the kings depart:
Still stands Thine ancient sacrifice,
An humble and a contrite heart.
Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget — lest we forget!
Far-called, our navies melt away;
On dune and headland sinks the fire:
Lo, all our pomp of yesterday
Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!
Judge of the Nations, spare us yet,
Lest we forget — lest we forget!
If, drunk with sight of power, we loose
Wild tongues that have not Thee in awe —
Such boasting as the Gentiles use
Or lesser breeds without the law —
Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget — lest we forget!
For heathen heart that puts her trust
In reeking tube and iron shard —
All valiant dust that builds on dust,
And guarding, calls not Thee to guard —
For frantic boast and foolish word,
Thy mercy on Thy people, Lord!

May America find the humility to turn back from the path that so many
other nations, from Nineveh and Tyre to Ottoman Turkey and Britain,
have followed. May her citizens resolve to no more allow ourselves to
be seduced by imperialist insiders, who care not for the destiny of
our fair Republic but only for power and Self. May we return to the
restraint of Washington and Jefferson, and seek once more to be a
shining city on a hill for all the world to see, not a wrathful
military colossus for all the world to fear. May we put our trust in
God, rather than in the arm of the flesh — lest we forget.